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Foucault as Translator of Binswanger and von Weizsäcker 
Theory, Culture and Society, forthcoming – part of a theme issue on “Foucault 
Before the Collège de France”, edited by Stuart Elden, Orazio Irrera and 
Daniele Lorenzini. 
Abstract 
Foucault’s Introduction to a translation of Ludwig Binswanger’s essay ‘Dream and Existence’ 
was published in late 1954. The translation was credited to Jacqueline Verdeaux, with 
Foucault acknowledged for the notes. Yet Verdeaux herself indicates the intensely 
collaborative nature of their working process and the translation. In 1958, Victor von 
Weizsäcker’s Der Gestaltkreis was published in French as Le Cycle de la structure, translated 
by Foucault and Daniel Rocher. Foucault went on to translate and introduce Immanuel 
Kant’s Anthropology as his secondary doctoral thesis. His engagement with Kant and 
Binswanger’s ideas has been discussed in the literature, but his role as translator has 
generally been neglected. His engagement with von Weizsäcker is almost never mentioned. 
This article critically discusses Foucault’s role in the Binswanger and von Weizsäcker 
translations, comparing the German originals with the French texts, and showing how this is 
a useful additional element to the story of the early Foucault. 
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Introduction 
This article discusses Foucault’s early work as a translator of two texts, both collaborative. 
One was Ludwig Binswanger’s essay ‘Traum und Existenz [Dream and Existence]’, which is 
best known to Foucault scholars because of its long introduction. It has the publication date 
of 1954, but printing was delayed and it did not actually appear until early 1955. Jacqueline 
Verdeaux was credited for the translation; Foucault for the introduction and notes, but 
there are strong indications Foucault was an active participant in the translation process. 
The other text was a book by Viktor von Weizsäcker, Der Gestaltkreis: Theorie der Einheit 
von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen  [The Gestalt Cycle: Theory of the Unity of Perception and 
Movement], which Foucault co-translated with Daniel Rocher as Le Cycle de la structure. 
This translation appeared in 1958, but was completed a few years earlier. These translations 
were made at the time Foucault was beginning his teaching career at the University of Lille 
and the École normale supérieure in Paris. They are closely related in production to 
Foucault’s first book, Maladie mentale et personnalité (1954). The Introduction to the 
Binswanger text was the last text written for publication until the History of Madness in 
1961 – two book chapters which appeared in 1957 were likely completed a few years 
before.  
Ludwig Binswanger 
On 22 September 1950, in the Amphithéâtre Descartes at the Sorbonne, where Edmund 
Husserl had given his ‘Cartesian Meditations’ lectures twenty-one years before, Ludwig 
Binswanger opened a symposium on ‘Analyse existentielle’. An extract of his opening 
speech was published the following year in the journal L’Encéphale. The translator was 
Victor Gourevitch, but when it appeared in print as “La ‘Daseinsanalyse’ en Psychiatrie” in 
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1951, the translation had been amended by the author with Georges and Jacqueline 
Verdeaux.1 
Jacqueline Verdeaux had previously co-translated Ruth Bochner and Florence Halpern’s The 
Clinical Application of the Rorschach Test (1945; 1948) with André Ombredane. Rorschach 
tests were to be the topic of her next project. Verdeaux was asked by Ombredane to meet 
with the Swiss psychologist Roland Kuhn and to show him a translation of a work of 
psychiatric diagnostics (Eribon 2011, 80). At the same time Ombredane lent her a copy of 
Kuhn’s book Maskendeutungen im Rorschachsche Versuch [On mask meanings in Rorschach 
experiments] (1944). Verdeaux went to visit Kuhn at his clinic in Münsterlingen on the 
Bodensee, and as well as sharing Ombredane’s translation, proposed that she translate his 
book on masks into French. It finally appeared in 1957 as Phénoménologie du masque à 
travers le Test de Rorschach (1992). As well as agreeing to her translation of his own book, 
Kuhn suggested to Verdeaux that she should also translate more of his friend and colleague 
Binswanger’s work (Macey 1993, 59).  
Even before the Sorbonne lecture Binswanger was not unknown in France. He had been 
cited by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and in some psychiatric work by Eugène Minkowski and 
Henri Ey, and an essay of his had been translated in 1938 (retranslated in 1970, 201-37). 
Verdeaux and Binswanger discussed some more translation ideas, and agreed the next piece 
should be the 1930 essay ‘Traum und Existenz’. Kuhn reports Binswanger as saying that the 
text was “conceived as an introduction to the method of work he had been developing until 
that point” (2001, 153). Verdeaux began work even though no publisher had been found 
(Eribon 2011, 80-1; Macey 1993, 59).  
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Binswanger worked at the Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen, which he had directed since 
1910. It had been founded by his grandfather, then directed by his father. This was not the 
full extent of the family business – Ludwig’s uncle Otto, a professor of psychiatry at the 
University of Jena, had treated Friedrich Nietzsche. Binswanger had studied with Eugen 
Bleuler, Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung and Karl Jaspers. Extraordinarily, given the Foucault 
connection, Ludwig Binswanger also treated the novelist Raymond Roussel, but Élisabeth 
Roudinesco notes that “the case history he assembled of his patient has not survived” 
(1990, 30). Binswanger’s earliest writings show the profound influence of Freud on his 
thinking, and his philosophical engagement with German thought, especially neo-
Kantianism.2 He kept up a correspondence with Freud which lasted from 1908 until 1938, 
just before Freud’s death in 1939 (Freud and Binswanger, 1992; 2003; see Binswanger 
1956a; 1957c). Schizophrenia was one of Binswanger’s key interests, with four major studies 
published on the topic.3 
Caroline Gros suggests that there are three main periods in Binswanger’s work, 
corresponding to his engagement with Freud, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger (2009, 
19). It was his engagement with Heidegger that would shape his work most profoundly. He 
read Heidegger from 1928 (Gros-Azorin 1998, 24), began a correspondence with him that 
year, and they met for the first time in 1929. Their correspondence only ended with 
Binswanger’s death in 1966.4 He was not uncritical, and in particular challenged Heidegger’s 
notion of care as the resolution to issues with a stress instead on love (Binswanger, 1992-94, 
Vol 3, 236; 1958, 195; see Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, 13). The resulting development of 
psychoanalysis in the light of Heidegger’s work is sometimes known as existential 
psychotherapy, but Binswanger’s own preferred term was Daseinsanalyse. Kuhn 
underscores that “Binswanger insisted many times on the fact that Daseinsanalysis was 
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above all a method of scientific research and not a method for psychotherapeutic practice” 
(2001, 161). There is no space for a fuller discussion of Binswanger’s work here, but by the 
time he wrote ‘Dream and Existence’ in 1930, he was in the last of these periods. 
Translating Binswanger 
Verdeaux had worked with Jacques Lacan, and was working and studying at the Hôpital 
Sainte-Anne in Paris. This work and her previous translation experience meant that the 
psychoanalytic and clinical vocabulary of Binswanger did not pose many problems for her, 
though there were greater challenges when it came to the philosophical language, 
especially regarding Heidegger and phenomenology. While Kuhn had referenced Heidegger 
in Maskendeutungen im Rorschachsche Versuch concerning angst, innerworldly-being and 
being and appearance (1992, 68, 215), Binswanger’s text was of a different order of 
magnitude. As Verdeaux was less familiar with that technical language, she turned to 
Foucault for help. Verdeaux had known Foucault since his childhood, as her parents had 
been friends of Foucault’s. She had spent the war with her brother in the safety of Poitiers, 
and during that time she became the assistant anaesthetist to Foucault’s father, Dr Paul 
Foucault (Eribon 2011, 79; Macey 1993, 6-7).  
Foucault had been a serious reader of Heidegger since his student years, and this was an 
ideal opportunity for him. It combined his professional interest in psychology, which he was 
teaching at the time in both Paris and Lille, with his background in philosophy. He knew the 
specialised vocabulary and had ideas of how to render it in French. Indeed, relatively little of 
Heidegger’s work was translated at the time, and Foucault and Verdeaux are partly shaping 
the vocabulary themselves, rather than simply rendering it consistent to existing works in 
French. The resulting translation was attributed to Verdeaux alone. Verdeaux’s reports of 
6 
 
their working practices to Eribon and Macey suggest that the translation was rather more 
collaborative. They met in the late afternoon or evening at the Ecole Normale Supérieure 
after Verdeaux had finished work at Sainte-Anne, and they discussed the best way to render 
the terms into French (Eribon 2011, 81; Macey 1993, 60). Work on the translation began at 
the end of 1953, and was completed in February 1954, when a copy was sent to 
Binswanger.5 
While Foucault does not get a translator credit, he was credited for the notes. In fact, some 
of these notes are Binswanger’s own, though the distinction is not marked. Some of the 
additional notes are simply to provide a reference: Foucault spells out that Maler Nolten 
(1992, 101; 1954, 140; 1993, 84) is a reference to Eduard Mörike’s novel Nolten, the Painter 
(1954, 140 n. 1); or that an unreferenced quotation (1992, 103; 1954, 143-44; 1993, 85-86) 
is from Goethe’s Faust (1954, 144 n. 1.). There are other unreferenced quotations which 
Foucault does not provide. Another note is an editorial reference that a phrase appears in 
French in Binswanger’s German text (1992, 97; 1954, 134; 1993, 82; 1954, 134 n. 1); 
Foucault also adds a reference to a Binswanger’s Wandlungen in der Auffassung und 
Deutung des Traumes [Transformations in the Perception and Interpretation of the Dream] 
which is only mentioned obliquely (1992, 105; 1954, 146; 1993, 86; 1954, 146 n. 1; 
Binswanger 1928). Two notes are, however, much more interesting than these mechanical 
ones, because they give an indication of translation choices. These notes have not been 
republished in this form, and since the original translation is hard to find, I include the 
French text below before a translation.  
Dasein as Présence 
The first note, on the opening page of Binswanger’s text, reads: 
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Avec l’accord de l’auteur, nous avons traduit Dasein par «présence». Bien entendu, 
cette traduction ne cherche pas à mettre en valeur les coordonnées spatio-
temporelles qui situeraient l’existence dans le hic et nunc d’une objectivité; mais elle 
nous a semblé plus valable que l’habituelle «existence» pour restituer dans sa 
structure significative le mot allemande Dasein («être là»). Ce qu’exprime la 
«présence», n’est-ce pas à la fois la facticité d’une existence en situation (présence 
ici), et, en même temps, son ouverture sur un monde (présence au monde)?  
With the author’s agreement we have translated Dasein as ‘présence [presence]’. Of 
course, this translation does not mean to foreground existence within the spatio-
temporal coordinates of the hic and nunc of objectivity, but it seems more useful to 
us than the usual ‘existence’ in order to give the significative structure of the 
German word Dasein (‘être là’ [being there’]). Is it not the case that ‘presence’ 
expresses both the facticity of existence in a situation – presence here – and at the 
same time – its opening to a world (presence to the world)? (1954, 131 n. 1)  
In the 1971 reedition of the text, this note is incorporated into the Glossary, with Foucault 
and Binswanger being acknowledged for the formulation (Verdeaux and Kuhn 1971, 30). 
Macey has commented that, “in terms of translation practice, the most interesting feature 
of the text is the joint decision, reached after lengthy discussion, to render Dasein as 
‘presence in the world’” (Macey 1993, 59). While it is ‘presence’, not ‘presence in the 
world’, the point is well made. Dasein is a standard German word which means existence, 
and can be found in philosophical texts before Heidegger. But in his 1927 book Sein und Zeit, 
Being and Time, Heidegger uses it in a stressed way to examine the particular structures and 
characteristics of human existence, their experience of being. Heidegger also uses the word 
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Existenz, of Latinate rather than Germanic roots, and translations try to find some way of 
marking the distinction. For example, Heidegger says that “the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its 
existence [Existenz]” (1927, 42; 1962, 67).6 
Heidegger importantly highlights the word’s linguistic sense of Da-sein, literally there-being 
or being-the-there. While Heidegger stressed that the ‘there’ should not be understood in a 
simple, spatial, sense of location, some early French translations or adaptions, notably Jean-
Paul Sartre’s L’être et le néant, Being and Nothingness, used the term être-là, and some 
English translations followed suit with ‘being-there’. Early French translations, such as Henry 
Corbin’s 1938 translation of What is Metaphysics? as Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique? had 
used the term la réalité humaine (i.e. 22; see Bligh 2011). Simply keeping the German word 
Dasein has become standard practice in modern English and French translations, indicating 
the distinctive philosophical weight Heidegger gives it. Binswanger adopts the distinction 
between Existenz and Dasein from Heidegger, and so Foucault and Verdeaux had to face 
this challenge. They translate Existenz as existence (i.e. 1992, 96; 1954, 133; 1993, 81) and 
Dasein sometimes in the same way (1992, 95, 96; 1954, 132, 133; 1993, 81, 82). But 
generally, they do translate Dasein as présence. Examples include “Unseres Dasein” as 
“notre présence”, i.e. our Dasein (1992, 99; 1954, 138; 1993, 83); and “dieses Wir, das 
Subjekt des Daseins” as “ce nous, sujet de la présence“, “this we, the subject of Dasein” 
(1992, 100; 1954, 139; 1993, 84). 
In his 1950 Paris lecture, Binswanger had noted that he rejected the use of the French term 
‘existence’ and that he would use the German Dasein instead. Although the symposium was 
on ‘Analyse existentielle’ he says it should be on ‘Daseins-analyse’. Dasein, he notes, is an 
“almost untranslatable” word, and even suggests “Analyse anthropologique 
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phénoménologique” as a possibility (1951, 108). He underlines that “phenomenology is the 
only method appropriate to anthropology” (1951, 110). By anthropology he means the same 
kind of thing Foucault did in a Lille and ENS course of the same period, namely a science of 
the human in the broadest sense, the issue of being human.7 One of the reasons Binswanger 
resists ‘existence’ is that it evokes the idea of ‘existentialism’ and, to his mind, “Heidegger is 
an ontologist philosopher and not an existential philosopher in the manner of Sartre” (1951, 
108-9). The second reason is that “‘Dasein’ includes the soul and the body, the conscious 
and the unconscious, the voluntary and the involuntary, thought and action, emotivity, 
affectivity and instinct and that an idea which includes all of this can only be that of Being 
itself, to the exclusion of any qualification” (1951, 109). It might therefore be questioned 
why, a few years later, Verdeaux and Foucault, with Binswanger’s support, chose to render 
Dasein as présence. 
As Henri Maldiney underlines, this term is fundamental to understanding the approach 
which Binswanger develops: “Daseinsanalysis is first an analysis of the structural and 
temporal structures of présence” (1973, 92). However, it is worth stressing that Verdeaux 
and Foucault do not use the term présence simply as a translation of Binswanger’s use of 
Dasein, but also for Heidegger’s use. This is found when Binswanger quotes Heidegger, and 
the translators adopt this term there. One example is helpful in giving a context to 
Binswanger’s use for his focus on the relation between dream and existence:  
Hier ist, um mit Heidegger zu reden, das Dasein vor sein Sein gebracht; es ist 
gebracht, insofern als ihm etwas geschieht, und als er nicht weiss, wie und was ihm 
geschieht. Das ist der ontologische Grundzug all Träumens und seiner 
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Verwandtschaft mit der Angst! [4] Träumen heisst: Ich weiss nicht, wie mir 
geschieht.  
Nous dirons ici, pour parler avec Heidegger, que la «présence est amenée devant son 
être». Elle y est amenée dans la mesure où quelque chose lui arrive et où elle ne sait 
pas comment cela lui est arrivé ni même ce qui lui est arrivé. Ceci est le trait 
ontologique fondamental de tout rêve et de sa parenté avec l’angoisse [1]. Rêver 
signifie: «Je ne sais pas ce qui m’arrive».  
To use Heidegger’s words here, ‘Dasein is brought before its own being’—insofar, 
that is, as something happens to it and Dasein knows neither the ‘how’ nor the 
‘what’ of the happening. This is the basic ontological element of all dreaming and its 
relatedness to anxiety or angst [12]. To dream means: I don’t know what is 
happening to me. (1992, 134; 1954, 190-1; 1993, 102)  
It is clear that Binswanger sees this insight as profoundly significant for his project. The 
notion of Angst, generally translated into English either as anxiety or angst, is here angoisse, 
anguish or fear. Binswanger indicates that dreaming is an excellent example of this 
detachment which Heidegger speaks about. The note makes a reference to Heidegger’s 
What is Metaphysics? though the quotation is from Being and Time (1927, 184; 1962, 228). 
In the note Binswanger comments: 
Wir betrachten die Angstträume als den Prototyp der im Dasein als solchem 
gelegenen existentiellen Urangst. Vgl Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?  
Nous considérons les rêves d’angoisse comme le prototype de l’angoisse 
existentielle originelle, déposée dans la présence en tant que telle (Cf Heidegger, 
Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique?)  
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We view anxiety dreams as the prototype of the Dasein’s (as such) primal essential 
anxiety. See Heidegger, What is Metaphysics? (1992, 134 n. 4; 1954, 191 n. 1; 1993, 
105 n. 12). 
Indeed, this status which Binswanger accords the dream as “eine bestimmte Art des 
Menschseins”, “une modalité particulière de l’être humaine”, “a determined mode of 
human being” is crucial (1992, 102; 1954, 142; 1993, 85). He sees the dream as an addition 
to Heidegger’s privileged modes of access to ontological understanding. For Heidegger, 
thought, as opposed to philosophy, and poetry were central. Binswanger suggests that for 
insight into the “essential ontological structure” [of “tottering, sinking, falling”], there are 
three aspects: “Language, the imagination of the poet, and—above all—the dream” (1992, 
99; 1954, 137; 1993, 83). Yet while this third addition is Binswanger’s major contribution in 
the essay, Verdeaux and Foucault push him still further. Binswanger says “den die Sprache 
ist es, die für uns alle «dichtet und denkt», noch ehe der Einzelne es zum eigenen Dichten 
und Denken gebracht hat”, which we might render as “for it is language which ‘poetizes and 
thinks’ for us before the individual themselves is able to poetize and think”. Extraordinarily, 
Verdeaux and Foucault chose to render “dichtet und denkt” as “rêve et crée” – “dreams and 
creates” (1992, 95; 1954, 132; 1993, 81). A literal translation of their translation would read 
“For it is language which ‘dreams and creates’ for us before the individual themselves is able 
to dream and create”. For Heidegger, especially in his readings of Friedrich Hölderlin, and 
following him Binswanger, there is a close relation between thinking and poetizing, 
something entirely missed in Verdeaux and Foucault’s rendering. 
Stimmung 
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The second note by Foucault to the French text is also revealing, and relates to the term 
bestimmte cited above. Binswanger makes a note of the distinction between “Im Bild und in 
der stimmungsmässigen Reaktion auf dasselbe” – “the image and the affective response to 
the image”, which Verdeaux and Foucault render as “l’image et dans la réaction thymique”. 
They add a note at this point: 
Binswanger emploie le mot Stimmung pour désigner aussi bien la coloration 
affective d’une expérience vécue que le caractère réceptif de l’existence humaine 
considérée au niveau de l’existentiel ontologique (cf plus haut, le mot réceptivité). 
En effet, aucun mot français ne nous a paru correspondre, à lui seul, à une acception 
aussi large, nous l’avons traduit par ‘humeur’ chaque fois que le mot Stimmung était 
analysé surtout au niveau de l’expérience psychologique. 
Binswanger employs the word Stimmung to designate as much the affective 
coloration of a lived experience as the receptive characteristic of human existence – 
considered at the level of an ontological existential (see, above, the word 
réceptivité). However, no single French word seems to correspond to this broad 
meaning, so we have translated Stimmung as ‘humour’ each time the word 
Stimmung is analysed at the level of psychological experience (1954, 151 n. 1). 
In the 1971 reedition of the text, this note appears as a translator’s note in an earlier 
location, with the omission of the comment on réceptivité (201 n. 2). In place of the original 
note, there is a cross-reference to the earlier discussion (208 n. 6). 
The reference to réceptivité is important. It comes when Binswanger’s “Geworfensein der 
Stimmung” is translated as “l’abandon à la réceptivité”. While the French would be literally 
rendered as “the abandonment (or surrender) to receptivity”, a more Heideggerian reading 
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of the German would be something like “the being-thrown of mood” (1992, 98; 1954, 135; 
1993, 82). It is clear that the note in the text shows a deep understanding of the notion of 
Stimmung, even if we might quibble with the choice of humeur as its principal translation. 
‘Mood’ or ‘attunement’ are more common English renderings, and there is arguably a 
lineage to more recent discussions of ‘affect’. 
Yet Stimmung does not just appear as a substantive, but also as an element within other 
words. The term “bestimmte” and “stimmungsmässigen” were discussed above, and there 
are other examples. Two come in this contrast between “Gestimmtsein” and “den längeren 
und tieferen Wellen der normalen und pathologischen exaltierten und depressiven 
«Verstimmung»”. Verdeaux and Foucault render this as “l’humeur suscitée… aux ondes plus 
longues et plus profondes de «l’altération de l’humeur» exaltée et depressive, chez les êtres 
normaux et pathologiques”. The contrast is between Gestimmtsein, being-attuned, and “the 
larger and deeper rhythms of normal and pathologically manic and depressive 
disattunement [Verstimmung]”; which Verdeaux and Foucault put in a way which would be 
literally re-translated as “humour aroused” and “alteration of humour” (1992, 108; 1954, 
152; 1993, 88). Elsewhere, they translate Stimmungsgehalt as contenu thymique (1992, 111; 
1954, 157; 1993, 90). 
Other Choices 
Some other translation choices are also worth noting. For the German Erlebnis they use, not 
the simple ‘experience’, but “l’expérience vécue”, “lived experience”, to stress the German 
word for life, Leben (1992, 95; 1954, 132; 1993, 81). They chose to translate the German 
Trieb as instinct, instinct, rather than as pulsion, drive (1992, 132; 1954, 188; 1993, 101). 
Given Freud marks a distinction between the German Instinkt and Trieb, the choice is 
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potentially confusing. This has been a theme much discussed in terms of how Freud should 
be translated into English. 
One of the key aspects of Heidegger’s work is that Dasein is always already embedded in a 
world – not first a subject which then encounters a world, but his hyphenated term of In-
der-Welt-Sein, being-in-the-world. He also uses the term Welt, world, in compounds such as 
Umwelt, Mitwelt – literally the surrounding world and the with-world, often translated as 
environment and shared-world – and Eigenwelt, the own-world of self-reflection. The 
notion of Umwelt is much used in environmental psychology, especially in work following 
the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, and in French is often translated as milieu. Yet when 
Binswanger uses the phrase “Um- und Mitwelt”, Verdeaux and Foucault chose to render this 
as “le monde extérieur et le monde d’autrui”, literally “the exterior world and the world of 
the other” (1992, 96; 1954, 133; 1993, 81). This is arguably a misunderstanding of both 
terms: the world is not exterior to Dasein, but surrounding, enveloping, of which Dasein is 
an essential part. Similarly, Mitwelt is not the world of others, but the world of our 
encounter with others, shared or together. Binswanger also stresses the importance of 
Mitsein, being-with or co-existence. Heidegger begins to develop themes around this 
question in Being and Time, even if his main focus is on Dasein and its engagements in the 
world and with other beings as a means of access to the question of being itself. As 
Maldiney puts it, the notion of with-man [Mit-Mensch] is crucial to Binswanger, whose work 
is more concerned with the inter-personal: “the man of the with; the man who exists to 
encounter [l’homme de l’avec, l’homme qui existe à rencontrer]. Dasein is Mitsein” (1973, 
209). 
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There is one significant difference between the original 1930 version of Binswanger’s essay 
in Neue Schweizer Rundschau and the 1947 reprint in Ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze. 
Although Binswanger notes the omission in his preface to the 1947 version, the paragraph 
does not appear in the French translation (1947-55, Vol I, 11).8 While its content is not 
especially important, a reader should have been alerted to its absence. Equally, in one 
passage, there is some of the quoted Greek missing from the French translation (1992, 126; 
1954, 178-9; 1993, 98). Verdeaux and Foucault’s translation is thus not a critical edition of 
the text, and, at times, even a little careless. Nor are these issues addressed in the reprint of 
the text in 1971. But it cannot be stressed enough the challenge they faced, with relatively 
little of Heidegger’s work translated into French at the time. Verdeaux and Foucault were 
forging a path not just in the translation of Binswanger, but also in his use of Heideggerian 
terms. 
Introducing Binswanger 
Having completed the translation, Verdeaux recalls saying to Foucault: “If you like the book, 
do a preface for it” (quoted in Eribon 2011, 81). Verdeaux continues that while she was in 
Provence on holiday over Easter 1954, she received a large envelope. It contained a long 
sprawling text, just over twice as long as the essay it introduced. Foucault’s note simply 
read: “Here is your Easter egg” (cited in Eribon 2011, 81-2). This story should be taken with 
some scepticism, as there was discussion of an introduction earlier that year. But its length 
seems to have surprised everyone. Verdeaux was enthusiastic about the text, and so 
Foucault sent it to Binswanger on 27 April 1954. In a letter to Binswanger accompanying the 
text, Foucault says that he has two purposes: “to show the importance of the dream for 
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existential analysis [analyse existentielle]” and “to show how your conception of the dream 
implies a complete renewal of analyses of imagination”.9  
Binswanger’s reply to Foucault of 6 May 1954 shows that he not only read the introduction 
with interest, but shared it with Kuhn and Wilhelm Szilasi, a former colleague of Husserl and 
Heidegger, now living in Switzerland.10 A few days later, on 10 May 1954, he wrote again, 
saying that it Foucault had done “an excellent job”, which was a “great scientific honour” to 
him, especially praising his work on the “movement of the imagination”, and extending his 
work on the dream, as he had done to Freud.11 The letter goes on to note a number of 
qualifications to Foucault’s introduction, which Foucault says he will address in its revision.12 
It is not clear how many actually were, since the published text contains the issues 
Binswanger raised. 
Foucault’s friend Maurice Pinguet recalled that Foucault found it amusing to have written an 
essay over twice as long as the text it introduced (2009, 52). There was some difficulty 
persuading the publisher to accept a long text by an unknown thinker introducing a 
translation by someone who was scarcely known in France. Le rêve et l’existence did not 
receive much attention when it was published. While a few hundred copies were sold quite 
quickly, a couple of years later the “remaining copies were pulped” (Macey 1993, 60-61). 
There are only two critical discussions in the 1950s. One was in an essay by Henri Ey in 
L’Evolution Psychiatrique in 1956, which mentions Foucault’s “magnificent and substantial 
introduction” (109 n. 1). A review by Robert Misrahi in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 
appeared in 1959. Misrahi describes the importance of the introduction, outlining in some 
detail its conceptual moves and the use Foucault makes of Binswanger’s text. It is critical of 
Foucault’s neglect of Sartre, though Misrahi does agree with Foucault – who is himself 
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following Heidegger and Binswanger’s approach – that philosophy must begin by being an 
anthropology before becoming an ontology, and finally “an ethics of history and historicity” 
(1959, 105-6). Yet what is perhaps most interesting about this review is that it is much more 
about Foucault than Binswanger, and as well as being the most significant discussion of the 
Introduction, is the first sustained engagement with Foucault’s work at all.  
Foucault’s text is more than just an introduction, as Binswanger himself noted. It also 
promises a future work continuing its themes which was never published (1994, 65; 1993, 
31). Yet a fuller manuscript on Binswanger was written around this time, and is discussed by 
Elisabetta Basso elsewhere in this issue. This seems to be the text which Foucault indicated. 
The manuscript, like the Introduction, develops themes from some of Foucault’s teaching in 
this period.13 Rather than needing to be persuaded by Verdeaux to write an introduction to 
a text for which he had discovered a real enthusiasm, it seems that Foucault had a wealth of 
material on Binswanger already prepared in relation to his teaching, and that this project 
gave him a suitable outlet. Basso has also suggested that reading this introduction in the 
light of the Lille lecture courses allows us to see that this concern was not merely a 
“misstep” in Foucault’s career, but that it links to the work that went into History of 
Madness (2016, 40-41; see Basso, this issue). Yet the path there is not straight-forward, and 
Foucault’s inquiries went down many detours (see Elden, forthcoming). Of course, since 
Foucault’s profile rose, the limited attention to this text has changed somewhat, though it 
remains a neglected part of his work (see Revel 1992; Monod 1997; Sabot 2006; Smyth, 
2011). 
Verdeaux continued work on Binswanger after this initial essay, acting as translator of one 
of his case studies on schizophrenia, the Le cas Suzanne Urban (1957b). Though it is credited 
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to Verdeaux alone, Basso has suggested that Foucault and Kuhn should share the translator 
credits for this work (2007, 319), while Binswanger’s preface to the translation simply 
thanks them as his “friends” for their “precious advice” (1957b, 11). Verdeaux also 
translated Jakob Wyrsch’s Die Person des Schizophrenen (1949; 1956). Foucault’s links to 
Binswanger ended after he moved to Uppsala in 1955: the only letter from Foucault after 
1954 was a note thanking Binswanger for sending him a copy of his Erinnerungen an 
Sigmund Freud in 1956.14 In 1971 Verdeaux was the lead translator of a collection of 
Binswanger’s work that appeared in the Arguments series edited by Kostas Axelos with Les 
Éditions de Minuit. This text has a preface by Roland Kuhn and Henri Maldiney, and a 
glossary by Verdeaux and Kuhn. The 1954 translation of ‘Dream and Existence’ is reprinted 
in this collection (1971, 199-215); a more recent translation was made by Françoise Dastur 
in 2012. Foucault’s role goes unmentioned in the 1971 reprint: even his notes are now 
incorporated as either translator notes or into the Glossary. Verdeaux’s later translation 
projects seem to be disconnected from the psychological works – they include writings on 
theatre, ethnography and libretti.  
Viktor von Weisäcker 
While Foucault’s introduction to the Binswanger text is fairly well known, his role as a co-
translator of a text by Viktor von Weizsäcker, Der Gestaltkreis, is rarely discussed at all. Von 
Weizsäcker was a physician and neurologist, who became professor of Neurology and 
director of the Institute of Neurological Research in Breslau, formerly in Germany, and now 
Wrocław in Poland. Von Weizsäcker, who died in 1957, was one of the founders of medical 
anthropology (see Hahn 1991; Célis 2004, 2007; Wiedebach 2009). He came from a very 
distinguished elite family. His brother was the naval officer and Nazi diplomat Ernst von 
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Weizsäcker; and Viktor was therefore the uncle of future president of Germany, Richard von 
Weizsäcker and the physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. In his work he was critical of 
claims of a pure, objective science, and played a crucial role in the development of 
“psychosomatics and social medicine” (Böhme 2007, 18).  
Quite how Foucault came to be involved in the translation is unclear. Daniel Rocher, his co-
translator, was also a former philosophy student from the École Normale Supérieure. Henri 
Ey provides an introduction. Ey was a major figure in French psychiatry for almost fifty years, 
though little of his work is in English (see 1950-54; 1969). Foucault would have heard Ey 
lecture at Sainte-Anne (Eribon 2011, 75-76; Macey 1993, 41), and this may have been the 
link that brought him to the project. Binswanger occasionally references von Weizsäcker in 
his work (i.e. 1992-94 Vol 3, 240-41; 1958, 198-99); and as Gros suggests his work has a 
relation to von Weizsäcker on illness as a creation of phenomena (2009, 8). Georges 
Canguilhem also had an interest in von Weizsäcker’s work (i.e. 1977, 167). The only other 
book by von Weizsäcker in French is Pathosophie (2011; see Palem 2012); none of his books 
are in English. 
Translation 
The translation was published on 3 February 1958, but was completed sometime before 
this. Foucault first mentions the translation as complete in 1953, when he was asked by the 
Université de Lille for a list of his publications, and the text was submitted to the press in 
late 1954. Defert’s indication that Foucault was still working on it while in Uppsala in March 
1956 (1994, 21) must refer to a stage in the book’s production process. The German text 
was first published in 1940; the translation is of the 1948 fourth edition. While the second 
and third editions have brief prefaces, the text was substantially the same, with just some 
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additions to the notes (1973, 4-5, 5; 1958, 34, 34-35). The fourth edition had a much more 
substantial preface (1973, 6-22; 1958, 19-31). Von Weizsäcker stresses that the preface is 
not an attempt to rewrite the work, but to indicate some marginal thoughts concerning 
themes he has returned to and others which have arisen since its first publication (1973, 7; 
1958, 20). The translation again appeared with Desclée de Brouwer, in the series on 
‘Bibliothèque Neuro-Psychiatrique de langue française’ which had also included 
Phénoménologie du masque and Le cas Suzanne Urban, as well as works by Ey (1950-54), 
and an early co-authored study by Lacan (Bonnafé et. al. 1950). 
The translation is interesting in multiple ways. It begins with the title – Der Gestaltkreis. 
Foucault and Rocher render this as Le Cycle de la structure. Structure is rather a restrictive 
translation of Gestalt, which is often untranslated. Gestalt literally means shape or form, but 
it has a specific sense in psychology, where it is used to describe the way that the mind 
forms a coherent whole which is not simply the combination of individual perceptions or 
reactions. Indeed, Kurt Koffka, one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, made the claim 
that “the whole is other than the sum of the parts”; suggesting this was a more accurate 
claim than it being “greater than the sum” (1999, 176). For Koffka the point was difference, 
not excess. While the projects should not be conflated, there is a resonance. As Ey stresses, 
for von Weizsäcker it is not “a simple structure in a circle [structure en cercle] (Kreisgestalt), 
but a ‘Gestaltkreis’, that is a cycle of structure [cycle de la structure]” (1958, 11). While 
‘structure’ as a choice is not in itself inaccurate, it certainly fails to capture the specific sense 
of the German term. Indeed, in the fourth edition preface von Weizsäcker notes that the 
term had an aspect and advantage he was not aware of initially: it does not imply a precise 
“cyclic structure [Kreisgestalt]”, but something which is not yet achieved. “This is the 
internal conflict between the perceptible image (suggested by the words ‘structure’ and 
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‘cycle’), and the concept without figure which produces the composition of these two 
words” (1973, 6; 1958, 19). 
The subtitle Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnehmen und Bewegen [Theory of the Unity of 
Perception and Movement] is also significant – the book indeed offers a theory to unify the 
psychological and the physiological. While this is therefore a work engaging with both 
disciplines, the literature which von Weizsäcker utilises is much wider. The work included in 
this book is, he says, not something which can be labelled “biology, psychophysics or 
philosophy of nature”, but a development of themes in each of these domains in relation to 
“experimental research, as well as an attempt to base new pathological and medical 
research on new foundations” (1973, 17; 1958, 27). In his terms, Gestaltkreis connects to 
biology, medicine and philosophy (1973, 22; 1958, 30) 
Von Weizsäcker’s resources include biologists such as Hans Driesch and von Uexküll. In 
addition, he draws on concepts from philosophy, like “form, movement, object 
[Gegenstand], etc.” and some from “philosophy of nature, such as space, time, function” 
(1973, 21; 1958, 30). Husserl and Heidegger are also important to his project, which helps to 
explain Foucault’s role in the translation and, presumably, his interest in the text. Ey thinks 
it is remarkable that the only French authors mentioned by von Weizsäcker are Henri 
Bergson and Sartre, and suggests that Merleau-Ponty may have been an inspiration (1958, 
7, 10). Yet as the 1946 preface to the third edition notes, some of the key works – Sartre’s 
1943 Being and Nothingness crucially – were published after the first edition had appeared 
in 1939 (1973, 5; 1958, 34-35). Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behaviour first appeared in 
1942, and Phenomenology of Perception not until 1945. Add to this the complications of 
printing and intellectual exchange during the war, and it makes more sense to imagine a 
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partly-shared intellectual project and references, than straight-forward influence. Yet this 
does not mean the approaches are the same. In the third edition von Weizsäcker suggests 
that Sartre’s book fills out what was only an “anticipation” in his own work, but adds rather 
cuttingly that this is “with the brilliant and decisive energy available to the philosopher who 
is better protected from the inextricable entanglement of empirical relations” (1973, 5; 
1958, 34-35). 
One of the most important aspects of von Weizsäcker’s work is that he broadens the 
psychological sense of Gestalt to encompass physiological issues, notably movement. He 
sees perception and movement as being flexible responses, not fixed, and reworked and 
tuned through experience. His focus on movement includes the nervous system and motor 
functions. Hence the book’s first theme is “movement of living beings [lebender 
Wesen/êtres vivants] but not just any bodily or purely imaginary movement in the spatio-
temporal system” (1973, 23; 1958, 37). The focus is rather on self-movement “spontaneity 
or auto-mobility [Spontaneität, die Selbstbewegung/spontanéité, «auto-mobilité»]” (1973, 
23; 1958, 37). He notes that “this implies that we admit the existence of a subject, of an 
active being for themselves and for their own ends” (1973, 23; 1958,37). He argues that “to 
study the living being, we must take part in life”. He is interested in life in its broadest sense, 
from birth to death (1973, 3; 1958, 33). For him, “Biologie ist Formenkunde”; “biology is 
science of forms” (1973, 198; 1958, 170). 
His focus requires him to discuss space and time in some detail, as a way of making sense of 
the encounter of the living being with their environment. Indeed, in the book’s only 
diagram, von Weizsäcker puts the two in direct relation - Organismus [O] and Umwelt [U] 
(1973, 200; 1958, 171). This circle is, von Weizsäcker stresses, closed, a cycle which does not 
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have an exterior or entry/exit point. He says that “we call the genesis of the forms of the 
movement of organisms the Gestaltkreis” (1973, 200; 1958, 171). As so many other 
theorists of this relation, von Weizsäcker draws upon von Uexküll’s work on the Umwelt. In 
distinction to the translation of ‘Dream and Existence’, Foucault and Rocher translate 
Umwelt sometimes as milieu ou monde environnant – milieu or environing world (1973, 
237; 1958, 197; see 1973, 31, 32; 1958, 43, 44 etc.); though when Umwelt is contrasted with 
Eigenwelt, own or self-world, they translate as “l’univers environnant et l’univers propre” 
(1973, 24; 1958, 38). All of these choices give a sense of the complexity of the German term, 
missed with a simple translation of environnement or environment. 
In understanding this spatial sense of a milieu, a key theme of the book is “orientation in 
space” (1973, 12; 1958, 23), and von Weizsäcker stresses that we “must distinguish between 
physical-mathematical and biological integration of space” (1973, 36; 1958, 47). As he 
expands: 
Physical-mathematical integration has a system of references constant in time. Its 
coordinates must be in a state of total immobility, and all bodies which refer to it are 
thus without contradiction between themselves. Biological integration only has a 
momentary value [Augenblicksgeltung/valeur momentanée]; its ‘system of 
references [Bezugssystem/système de références]’ can certainly have a certain 
duration, but also in each moment it can be sacrificed in favour of another. It is not 
therefore a system strictly speaking, but an arrangement [Einordnung/agencement] 
of biological operation in the present (1973, 36; 1958, 47). 
In common with Husserl, Heidegger and many who came after them, von Weizsäcker argues 
that lived space needs to be opposed to mathematical space (1973, 214-5; 1958, 180-1). “If 
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space is only biologically determined in relation to time, there follows from this – as with 
biological time – a net difference in structure from mathematical space” (1973, 215; 1958, 
180). 
Yet it is worth underlining that space is not a theme for him just in relation to physiology, 
but also in terms of psychology, with a stress on the importance of spatial aspects of 
perception as much as temporal ones (1973, 159-60; 1958, 142-3). He argues that space and 
time take their order from a situation [Situation/situation] and event or appropriation 
[Ereignis/événement]. So, rather than an event or situation being located in space and time, 
they give rise to its definition and form. “Things are not in space and time, but space and 
time arise in the development of the happening [Geschehens-Fortbildung/la continuité des 
événements] and are thus founded in, or on, things. The world and things in it are not in 
space and time, but space and time are in the world, in its things” (1973, 175-6; 1958, 154). 
Indeed, in the note he provides here, von Weizsäcker quotes Heidegger on space, a passage 
from Being and Time which is interesting for Foucault and Rocher’s translation of Dasein as, 
again, présence: 
Der Raum ist weder im Subjekt, noch ist die Welt im Raum. Der Raum ist vielmehr 
,in’ der Welt; sofern das für das Dasein konstitutive In-der-Welt-Sein Raum 
erschlossen hat. 
L’espace n’est pas dans le sujet et le monde n’est pas dans l’espace. L’espace est 
bien plutôt dans le monde; dans la mesure où l’être dans le monde, constitutif de la 
présence, a ouvert l’espace (1973, 287 n. 15; 1958, 154 n. 1). 
In English, Heidegger’s lines would read: 
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 Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather ‘in’ the world, to 
the extent that being-in-the-world, which is constitutive of Dasein, opens space.15 
It is important to underscore that Foucault and Rocher grasp the importance of the 
complicated notion of Ereignis, which von Weizsäcker uses in a Heideggerian way. Ereignis is 
an event, but it is also tied to the notion of eigen, own or proper, and can be rendered in 
English as ‘propriation’. Foucault and Rocher chose événement, which is an event, though 
they rather muddy the waters by using the same term for Geschehens, which has a similar 
sense of an event in an unstressed way, but is for Heidegger simply what happens. 
There are only two brief translator notes from Foucault and Rocher, both of which say the 
same thing, that the French percevoir, to perceive, translates the German Wahr-nehmen, 
“literally take for true [vrai]” (1958, 44 n. 1, 122 n. 1). According they translate the crucial 
Wahrnehmung as perception – one of the two key terms of the work along with Bewegung, 
mouvement. Von Weizsäcker also uses the compounds Selbstbewegung [automouvement – 
self-movement] and Selbstwahrnehmung [autoperception – self-perception]. Part of the 
reason for the lack of translator notes or a preface is that the text has a detailed Glossary, 
provided by von Weizsäcker with explanation of key terms. The translation of this provides 
the German term, before a French equivalent, and then von Weizsäcker’s gloss (1973, 291-
94; 1958, 227-30). A separate set of notes on translation choices is thus largely unnecessary. 
One choice is also notable for showing that Foucault had, perhaps, not fully assimilated 
Heidegger’s work. Abbau is rendered as disparition (which is also used to translate Ausfall, 
failure), rather than the literal unbuilding or dismantling: Abbau and Destruktion being the 
two terms Heidegger uses for his challenge to the philosophical tradition, which Jacques 
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Derrida would of course capture in the term deconstruction. Indeed, part of Derrida’s 
critique is of what he calls the “metaphysics of presence”. 
Political Controversy 
Von Weizsäcker is a controversial figure, though it is unclear how much of this Foucault 
could have been aware of in the mid-1950s. There is certainly no record Foucault met von 
Weizsäcker, who died a year before the French translation appeared. Von Weizsäcker can 
be judged both for his thought and his actions. In 1933, shortly after the Nazi party had 
gained power, he gave a lecture at the University of Freiburg on the invitation of Heidegger 
(Böhme 2007, 18). This was shortly after Heidegger had been appointed as Rector of the 
University, a political appointment which led to his joining the Nazi party. The lecture was 
part of a programme of political education for students, held at the Paulus concert hall in 
the town, since the University did not have a room of sufficient size.  
It has been suggested that because von Weizsäcker was not a Nazi, the invitation shows that 
Heidegger was still taking a distance from the regime (Young 1997, 20). Indeed, Heidegger 
interrupted a student speech on the National Socialist revolution before the lecture with the 
instruction “This jabber [Geschwätz - nonsense] will stop immediately!” (Picht 1977, 198-9; 
1990, 162-63). Heidegger’s political involvement with the Nazi regime has been widely 
discussed, and that is not the point here. Rather, it concerns von Weizsäcker and the politics 
of his work. The Freiburg lecture was published in 1934 in the Nazi journal Volk im Werden 
(reprinted in 1986, 143-57), and in it, Von Weizsäcker advocated euthanasia and the 
political control of medicine. This was because he argued that illness could be a social 
problem, not caused by the social, but a problem for the social and therefore of importance 
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beyond the individually sick body. Given that the nation was an organism, the pathogenic 
elements may need to be removed (see Böhme 2007, 22; Roth 1986).  
While von Weizsäcker was not tried for his actions during the war, some of his medical 
research was also complicit with the Nazi regime. In its early years he was supportive of the 
shift from a social insurance system to forced labour projects. Much more seriously, Gernot 
Böhme suggests that writings such as this 1933 lecture develop “a mode of thought that 
could be used to legitimate crimes against humanity” (2007, 18). Böhme argues that “von 
Weizsäcker never actually committed such crimes himself, though he shares some 
responsibility for at least one” (Böhme 2007, 18; see Baumann 2012). This is by far the most 
damning charge. The Institute he directed used the brains of children and young people 
murdered at the Loben (now Lubliniec) hospital for research.16 The hospital was notorious 
for evaluating paediatric patients, treating some and poisoning others. That von 
Weizsäcker’s research should have used the bodies for research is abhorrent. 
Some of his advocates ignore, or are ignorant of, this political controversy, which has only 
really become known since his death.17 Raphaël Célis, for example, in a brief biographical 
note to his study of von Weizsäcker’s medical and clinical ethics, says that “during the 
Second World War he devoted all his energy to caring for injured soldiers at the military 
hospital in Breslau” (2007, 23 n. 1). Hartwig Wiederbach is even more evasive, not 
mentioning the war, and simply noting that “in 1941 he was appointed, as successor of 
Otfrid Foerster, to the most prestigious chair in Neurology in Germany at the University in 
Breslau. In 1945 the Heidelberg Medical School established a chair in General Clinical 
Medicine especially for him” (2009, 361). This is the same formulation used in the 
prospectus for his Gesammelte Schriften, published by Suhrkamp.18 Wiederbach’s only 
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recognition of political links comes when he mentions his family and his brother’s role as a 
Nazi diplomat (2009, 375 n. 2). The Viktor von Weizsäcker Gesellschaft similarly glosses over 
this aspect, adding only that in January 1945 he escaped Breslau. Though unstated, this was 
part of a mass exodus as the Russians advanced and shortly before the siege of the city.19  
Like the Binswanger translation, von Weizsäcker’s Le Cycle de la structure does not appear 
to have sold well: few libraries stock it and second-hand copies are hard to find. There was 
only a single brief review note at the time of the book’s publication (Colnort-Bodet 1958). 
Foucault does not elsewhere refer to von Weizsäcker, and there are only limited notes on 
his work in the archive.20 The request to take on the project could have come direct from 
the press, with whom he had worked on the Binswanger volume, or through an 
intermediary such as Binswanger, Canguilhem or, most likely, Ey. It may well have just been 
a commission for a recently graduated student, trying to supplement his income. The 
translation of von Weizsäcker’s Der Gestaltkreis is important element in the story of the 
early Foucault, as it gives a further sense of how his work was shaped by the practice of 
translation. But given what we now know of von Weizsäcker’s politics, it is a disturbing one 
too. Ey’s preface to the translation gives no indication of this, which is more damning than it 
is for the text’s translators, since Ey was clearly a key figure in facilitating its publication in 
French. 
Conclusion 
After these two texts, the last major work Foucault translated was Immanuel Kant’s 
Anthropology, which together with a long introduction served as his secondary thesis 
alongside his History of Madness. This interest develops from a course on philosophical 
anthropology, delivered in Lille and Paris in the mid 1950s, through to the von Weizsäcker 
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translation. The Kant translation was published in 1964, accompanied only by a short 
‘Historical Note’; the introduction was available in archives and published only after his 
death (2009). This translation is examined in detail in my book The Early Foucault 
(forthcoming, Chapter 7). Foucault’s only other translation was a short essay by the literary 
theorist Leo Spitzer (1970). Unusually, this text was translated from English – although 
Spitzer was Austrian, this essay dates from his time at Johns Hopkins University.21 Those 
translations are topics for another place. Foucault’s earliest translations, of Binswanger and 
von Weizsäcker, taken with his published and unpublished writings of the 1950s set the 
scene for the much more famous work that follows. They indicate paths taken and those not 
taken, show his deep knowledge of the traditions of philosophy and psychology, and are 
crucial elements of the biography and intellectual formation of his work as an original 
thinker. 
Much of Foucault’s work is a dialogue between languages. In his earliest writings and 
especially in his teaching this is a dialogue between his French and German texts in 
philosophy and psychology. In the 1970s, he is reading a lot of historical texts in English, and 
then in his final years he is engaging with a range of Greek and Latin sources. As such, a 
focus on his own practice as a translator seems a worthwhile addendum to discussions of 
his work and its translation. 
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1  See Binswanger 1951, 108 n. 1 for the translator and editor details. On Binswanger, 
see Needleman 1963; Lanzoni 2005; Gros 2009; Basso 2017; and on the movement 
generally, Lantéri-Laura 1963, Cabestan and Dastur 2011 and Holzhey-Kunz 2014, 
Part I. 
2  See notably Binswanger 1922; for a discussion of his early work see Lanzoni 2003. 
There are relatively few texts from the earlier years reprinted in the Ausgewählte 
Werke. 
3  All first appeared in the Archives suisses de Neurologie et Psychiatrie and are 
collected in 1957a. Two are reprinted in 1992-94, Vol 4, 73-209, 210-332; and two 
are translated in English in May et. al. (eds.), 1958, 237-364 and Binswanger 1963, 
266-341. Verdeaux would translate another as 1957b. 
4  The correspondence is at the University of Tübingen in the Binswanger archive. 
Some of it is reproduced in Binswanger 1992-94, Vol 3, 339-47, and discussed in 
Herzog 1994, 89-106; Frie, 1999, 1997, 82-83 and Gros 2000. 
5  Basso 2015, 176; citing a postcard from Verdeaux to Binswanger on 2 January 1954 
and a letter of 3 February 1954. 
6  For a discussion of Existenz in the context of Binswanger’s essay, see Williams 1993, 
20.  
7  “Connaissance de l’homme et réflexion transcendentale”, Bibliothèque nationale de 
France, Fonds Michel Foucault, NAF28730 (46), Folder 1; see Sabot 2015. 
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8  The missing paragraph should be on 1992, 99; 1954, 138; 1993, 83; the English 
edition provides the text in a note (1993, 103-4 n. 4); the original German is 1930, 
676. 
9  Foucault to Binswanger, 27 April [1954], in Basso 2015, 183. 
10  Binswanger to Foucault, 6 May 1954, in Basso 2015, 184-85. 
11  Binswanger to Foucault, 10 May 1954, in Basso 2015, 186-87. 
12  Binswanger to Foucault, 10 May 1954, in Basso 2015, 187-92; Foucault to 
Binswanger, 21 May 1954, in Basso 2015, 192-94. 
13  This is archived as “Cours sur le phénoménologie et Binswanger”, Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, Fonds Michel Foucault, NAF 28730 (46), Folder 3. It is unclear if 
this is the course as delivered or a subsequent version intended to be a written text. 
14  Foucault to Binswanger, 10 July [1956?], in Basso 2015, 195. This copy is archived at 
Yale University, Beinecke library, Foucault 145. The note inside simply says “Pour M. 
Michel Foucault/amicalement/L.B.”. 
15  The reference by both von Weizsäcker and Foucault and Rocher is to Heidegger 
1927, 11; but it should be 111 (1962, 146). 
16  See http://www.uvm.edu/~lkaelber/children/loben/loben.html; on the wider 
question, see Mitscherlich 1949. 
17  In 1947 he published some reflections on euthanasia, developing from the doctors 
trials at Nuremberg, and eventually coming down against the practice.   
18  https://viktor-von-weizsaecker-gesellschaft.de/assets/pdf/Gesammelte-Werke-
prospekt.pdf 
19  See https://www.viktor-von-weizsaecker-gesellschaft.de/biographie.php?id=2  
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20  There are seven pages of notes in Bibliothèque nationale de France, Fonds Michel 
Foucault, NAF28730 (43), ‘Hegelei’. 
21  There is also a debate about the date of the translation. Although all copies of the 
book are from 1970 or later, many early bibliographies of Foucault date it to 1962, 
which seems to fit better with his chronology. 
